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INCENTIVES AND GOVERNMENT RELIEF FOR RISK
ABSTRACT
Government relief is offered for a widerange of risks -- natural
disaster, economic dislocation, sickness andinjury.This paper explores the
effect of such relief on incentives and theallocation of risk in a model
with private insurance.It is shown that government relief isinefficient,
even when its level is less than the private insurancecoverage that
individuals would otherwise have purchased andeven when private insurance
coverage is incomplete due to problems of moral hazard.
Louis Kaplow
Harvard Law School
Griswold Hall-Room 402
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138A number of important risks--naturaldisaster, economic dislocation,
sickness and injury --sometimesgive rise to government relief.tThis paper
examines the effect of such relief on incentives and the allocation of risk in
a model with private insurance.The primary conclusion is that government
relief distorts individuals' incentives:Individuals' decisions take into
account only their own exposure to loss --theportion of loss uncompensated
by government relief --ratherthan the total loss.Moreover, given the
availability of private insurance, the resulting loss from distorted
incentives exceeds any benefit from relief in allocating risk.
The paper begins with the straightforward situation in which insurance
companies can observe individuals' risk-reducing behavior.In this case, as
is well recognized, insurance policies in which premiums are based on behavior
allow individuals to achieve a first-best outcome (in which insurance against
loss is complete and incentives are not distorted) without government relief.
With relief, however, a first-best outcome is not achieved.Individuals
purchase full insurance coverage against their exposure, so that relief and
insurance completely compensate for any loss.But individuals are not induced
to behave optimally.They are concerned only about how their behavior affects
their insurance premiums, which, of course, are based on their exposure rather
than total losses; as a result, the effect of risk-reducing behavior on the
expected cost of government relief is ignored.
The paper then considers the situation in which insurance companies cannot
observe individuals' risk-reducing behavior.In this case, which involves
moral hazard, individuals generally purchase less than complete coverage
-
againsttheir exposure, in order to retain some incentive to reduce risk.
Relief, as distinguished from insurance, typically is not at a level chosen
by individuals and does not entail charging individuals a premium that is a
function of their observable behavior (including the level of insurance
coverage they purchase).
-1-Here government relief distorts insurance decisions and thus behavior as well:
In determining the degree of residual risk to bear, individuals do not take
into the account that their incentives to reduce risk affect the expected cost
of government relief.
After demonstrating these results,I comment briefly on the range of
situations to which they apply.
I.The Model
A.Definitions and First-Best Outcome
A standard model of the risk of loss and insurance2 is consideced in
studying government relief.It is assumed that individuals choose an
expenditure level x, which determines the probability p(x) of a loss A, where
<0and p"> 0.An individual's utility U is a function of wealth,
initially assumed to be zero, where U'.> 0 and U" <0.UA and U0 denote,
respectively, utility evaluated in the states with and without the loss
occurring.The government provides relief r in the event of a loss; the
program of relief is financed by a lump-sum tax r pr.An individual,
knowing the government's relief policy, chooses a level of insurance coverage
q, paid in the event of a loss, and ischarged an actuarially fair premium
it= pq.3An individual's expected utility is therefore
(1)EU =(l-p(x))U(-x -it-r)+p(*)U(-x-it-r-A+q+r)
=(l-p(x))U0+p(x)Ux.
The first-best levels of r,q, and x solve
2SeeArrow (1963), Holastram (1979), Shavell (1979).
It is assumed that insurance companies can observe individuals' aggregate
purchases of insurance (and that they know the government's relief policy).
See Arnott and Stiglitz (1987), Pauly (1974).
-2-(2) Max EU subject to:
r,r,q,ir,x
(A)r —pr
(B)ir —pq.
Substituting pr for r and pq for ir and differentiating (1), we have:
(3)dEU—dEU—(l-p)U[-p]+pU[-p+1]—0, or
(4)p(l-p)[U -U] 0.
Wealth will thus be equal in the states with and without a loss, so that
q +r—A.Hence, EU can be written simply as U(-x -p(x)A),so that the
first-best x must minimize x +p(x)A,the sum of the costs of avoiding the
loss and the expected ross.This implies that x is determined by
(5)p'(x) -
-
Thenext two sections consider optima'. relief.The government's problem
consists of choosing r so as to maximize expected utility subject to the
requirements that
-lump-sumtaxes finance expected relief payments --asin (2A)--and
-theindividua' chooses a feasible insurance contract and expenditure
level x so as to maximize expected utility, where r and r are taken as
given.
This problem is now ana'yzed explicitly in the two cases noted in the
introduction.
B.First-Best Insurance
If insurance companies can observe expenditure levels x, they will be ed
to offer insurance policies that take individuals' behavior into account. In
particular, assume that insurance companies charge a premium ifequalto
p(x)q.'As a result, the optimization problem for the government in this case
Alternative models would yield equivalent results.For example,
individuals could choose ir, while the insurance company would offer a schedule
q(x), where, for any x, q(x) is the level of coverage for which if— p(x)q(x).
-3-(6)Max EU subject to:
r,r
(A)r —pr
(B)MaxEU(
rsubject to:
q,ir,x
(1) ir(x) =p(x)q.
The government's problem (6), unlike (2), involves an added constraint (B),
corresponding to the condition that individuals' insurance coverage and
expenditure decisions are privately optimal.Note that, at r =0,the private
maximization in (B)is the same as that for the first best (2).
More generally, for any r,the problem (B) is identical to that in (2)
where one substitutes for the total loss A that portion to which the
individual is exposed,A -r(and initial income is -r).As a result, the
solution involves, from (4), equal wealth in the states with and without a
loss (q —A -r)and an expenditure level that minimizes x
-4-p(x)(A -r).
Hence,
(7)p'(x)
-
Itis clear (compare (5)) that the first-best level of x will be chosen ifand
only if r —0.In addition, the higher is r,the lower is x and the lower is
expected utility.6
PROPOSITION I:If the expenditure level x is observable by Insurance
companies, the first-best outcome is achieved with no relief, r =0.
Moreover, r =0is the unique optimum.
C.Second-Best Insurance
Itt many instances, x will not be observable by insurance companies, sothe
optimal insurance contract in the absence of government relief will be second-
The first best required only that q +r=A,so that q and r were redundant
instruments in (2).
6Itcan readily be demonstrated that sign dEU/dr —-signr, for r <A.For
r ￿A,the lowest possible x will be chosen; expected utility will be lower
than for any r <A.
-4-best due to moral hazard.In this case, the optimization problem for the
government is
(8)Max EU subject to:
r,r
(A)r —pr
(B) Max EUI subject to:
(1) r —pq
(ii) Max EUI
x
r,r,q,ir
(B) indicates that individuals purchase insurance to maximize expected utility
(given r and r).Constraint (ii) indicates that insurance is determined (and
the actuarially fair premium is set) taking into account that an individual
will choose x to maximize expected utility, with q and r taken as given (as
well as r and r).
This problem differs from that involving first-best insurance:The
earlier problem (6)for constraint (B)involved the maximization of expected
utility over q, it,andx (given r and r) subject to (i).Here (8), insurance
is subject to the familiar moral hazard problem.Government relief will make
matters worse, because individuals choose insurance coverage as if the loss
were A-rrather than A, which in turn affects their expenditure decision.
Note that the governments problem (8), involving the choice of r,is the same
as the individual's optimization problem (B) when r —0,involving the choice
of q, except that the former problem has an added constraint.7These
observations suggest the following result.
LEMMA:For any level of relief r, let q and x be the insurance coverage
and expenditure level that an individual would choose.Letbe the
expenditure level that would be chosen if r —0andinsurancecoverage is
r -tq.ThenEUIrqx= EU!3r+q*' andx ;thatis, the utility and
expenditurelevel at any level of relief canbereplicated with no relief and
insurancecoverage of r -tq.
It should be clear that this reasoning is not dependent upon the particular
model adopted here.
-5-PROOF:Let 2 0and—r+q.Consider insurance premium 9 —p.
Noting that 9 —0(since 2— 0),one has:
(9)9 +9—p=pr+pq r +r.
It is therefore clear that the maximization decision involving x (8Bii)is the
same for the original and transposed problem, sothe same expenditure level
will be chosen.5This implies that the posited premium 9satisfies(8Bi).
Thus, x =2 andexpected utility is the same for both problems, which
completes the proof.
The lemma immediately implies that r =0is an optimum, since the expected
utility achievable at any r 0ran also be achieved at r =0.In fact, r =0
is the unique optimum.To demonstrate this requires us to examine the first-
order conditions forq (SB) and x (BBii).For the latter,
(10)12-(l-p)U -p'T70-pU+p'U 0, or
(11) p'(x) =
-
o A -
whereU'— (l-p)U± pU.Compare this expression with (5) and (7).(Note
that if individuals were risk-neutral, (11) would reduce to p'
-r -q).)Whenchoosingx, individuals consider only the portion of
the loss that is not compensated by government relief or insurance.
For the maximizing insurance decision,
(12) =(l-)U[-xq -p -qp'xq} -P'xqU0+Uj[-xq-p-qp'xq+lJ
+P'xqux=0,
where x5 denotes the derivative of x with respect to q.Because (10) holds at
the optimum,9 many of the terms multiplying x5 can be eliminated, and the
This result holds if the solution is unique.See note 9.Forother cases,
it would be sufficient to assume that, if multiple global optima for x exist,
the same selection rule is used in the initisl and transposed problems.
As explored in Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) and Grossman and Hsrt (1983),for
this substitution necessarily to be valid, the solution to (10) must be a
-6-remainder can be regrouped as follows:
(13) —p(1-p)(U -tJ) -p'qxqU' 0.
The first term reflects the benefit of further equalizing wealth between the
statea with and without a loss, and the second is the incentive cost (moral
hazard).The critical feature for assessing the effect of government relief
is that this latter term is weighted by q, not q +r:Only that portion of
the incentive cost covered by insurance is reflected in the insurance
dectsion.The portion covered by government relief is ignored, just as in the
case of first-best insurance.
To establish uniqueness, note that, at any optimum r,the first-order
condition for q (13) must hold not only for the stated r, but also, under the
lemma, for the equivalent scheme in which —0.For the initial and
transposed schemes, all varfables in (13) have the same values, except
(possibly) for q and x.Therefore, qxq =
Toevaluate Xqandq'differentiatethe first-order condition for x (10)
with respect to q:
2
(14) -(l-p)Ug[-xq -- qpxJ+P')<qU -P'[<q -p-qp'xqj
-P"XqU0 -PU{Xq -- Qp'X+1] -P'XqUj
+P'UiHXq -p -qpxq+1]+P")<qUA O•
Grouping those terms that cortespond to U, the second derivative of expected
utility with respect to x,1° and rearranging yields
(15) xq[uxx -qp'[p'(U-U) -((l-p)U+pU)J]=
-p'[pU+(1-p)tJJ+p(1-p)[tJ -tJJ.
unique maximum.For present purposes, it is assumed that d2EU/dx2 <0where
relevant.
2
(l-p)U +pU+2p(U -U)+p"(U-U0).
-7-It simplifies to rewrite this expression as
(16:) xq(Uxx -q9) —
Forthe substitutions made, note that 9 and 0, as well as U will have the
same values for the initial and transposed schemes, given the resultsof the
lemma.Thus, we can equate
(17) Xq(Uxx -q9)q(Uxx -46) or
(18) xq(U/ -9)=4kq(Uxx/ -0).
Since qxq =4q'qi."Thisimplies r 0.
PROPOSITION II:No relief, r0, is the unique optimum, even when the
expenditure level x is not observable by insurance companies.
The lemma indicates that insurance can mimic any level of government
relief.Clearly, the government cannot improve upon r =0.12Uniqueness is
illuminated by considering how individuals will choose q when r e(0,A)
First, if r > q*, where q* is the optimal level of insurance when r 0,
individuals will purchase additional coverage despite the fact that the
government offers relief above the level of coverage they would otherwise have
purchased:At q =0,marginally increasing q reduces risk-bearing costs and
imposes no private incentive costs.(In (13), the first term is positive and
the second is zero.)Second, even if rq*, one would expect individuals to
purchase coverage such that q + r > q*:A marginal increase in total coverage
from q* will produce the same risk-spreading benefits as in the case in which
r0, but less incentive cost (since a portion of the incentive cost is borne
by the government).13
The only possible exceptions are:(1) U =0;see note 9.(2) qxq 0;
this implies equal wealth across states, which in turn implies (from 10) that
U' =0,which is ruled out by assumption.(3) qxq and are both infinite;
this will not hold at an optimum and would, in any event, from (16), impl1
that U -qO —0and U -9 0, which is only possible if, again, q —qor
if 9 —and —0,tiie latter having been considered.
12In the absence of an externality, this result should not be surprising.
The conclusion does not rule out all government action, such as taxes and
subsidies applied to the relevant activities.See Arnott and Stiglitz (1986)
-8-II.Concluding Remarks
Government relief for risk distorts incentives because individuals no
longer bear the full cost of their actions.Such relief is inefficient even
when insurance coverage is incomplete due to moral hazard.These results are
relevant to a wide range of government programs --includingdisaster relief,
Medicare, trade adjustment assistance, and bailouts--and,as now noted, to
windfall taxation and relief for changes in government policy as well.
(a)The model considered government relief for the risk of losses, but
the analysis is equally applicable to the symmetric case involving windfall
taxation of gains.Gains and losses are defined, after all, relative to an
arbitrary origin.(Suppose in the model that A,q,and r are negative, where
p>0and p" <0,)This application is consistent with the familiar notion
that windfall taxation of gains distorts incentives to generate the gains.
(b)An important source of risk is that associated with government action
itself --thatis, with the enactment, repeal, or modification of regulations,
tax rules, budget priorities, and so forth.The analysis presented here is
applicable to government-created risk, suggesting (other things equal) the
inefficiency of the wide range of mechanisms --includingcompensation and
windfall taxation, grandfathering, phased-in implementation --oftenemployed
to mitigate gains and losses for those who invested under the preexisting
regime 14
(c)If insurance markets suffer from imperfections other than moral
hazard, government relief may be efficient.One problem of particular
interest in this context is that some individuals may incorrectly perceive the
13Thisfinal argument holds only locally.Subtle wealth effects must be
ruled out to establish the result globally.Compare Kaplow (1987)
14Inthis context, it would often be relevant to consider a model in which p
is given and the loss A is a function of individual decisions x, because
individuals will often have little influence over the probability of
government action whereas the amount of loss will be determined by their level
of investment.(In such instances, the plausibility of first-best insurance
may be greater than otherwise because the relevant states often will be
observable.)For a model of this case and further consideration of issues
arising in this context, including the effect of relief on the government's
incentives, see Kaplow (1986, 1987).
-9-probability of loss'5If the probability is underestimated significantly,
government relief may have less of an adverse effect on incentives while
spreading risk for which individuals would not choose to purchase insurance.
Compulsory government insurance, however, would be more efficient than relief:
For example, one who contemplated construction on a flood plain and
underestimated the risk of a flood would be led to make a more efficient
decision if notified in advance of the compulsory premium that would be
charged -for different levels of investment in different locations.Observe
that government insurance (optional or compulsory) that imposes an actuarially
fair premiwn taking into account other insurance coverage or that prohibits
supplementary coverage has wholly different effects from those of government
relief.
5Ofcourse, other factors, such as adverse selection or administrative
costs, can also provide a case for government insurance or relief.Note that
diversification of ownership through financial markets may address these
problems in some instances.Moreover, as to unsystematic risk, a diversified
firm may effectively be risk-neutral, making all the more apparent the
inefficiency of government relief.(The government generally is in no better
position to absorb risk than are financial markets.See the discussion in
Kaplow (1987) of the applicability of the Arrow and Lind (1970) result in this
context.)
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